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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Steven W. Sparling appeals from the order withholding judgment entered 
upon his conditional guilty plea to possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. 
On appeal, he challenges the district court's order denying his motion to 
suppress. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Idaho State Trooper Blake Higley observed a vehicle turn into a gas 
station parking lot without signaling. (Prelim Tr., p.5, Ls.14-19; Defendant's 
Exhibit A, 0:05 - 0:20.) The trooper parked behind the vehicle and activated his 
emergency overhead lights. (Prelim Tr., p.6, Ls.6-8; Defendant's Exhibit A, 0:28 
- 0:40.) As the trooper approached, the driver of the vehicle, later identified as 
Steven Sparling, exited his vehicle and approached the patrol car. (Prelim Tr., 
p.6, Ls.4-21; Defendant's exhibit A, 0:40 - 0:50.) The trooper explained the 
reason for the stop, requested identification, and asked Sparling where he was 
coming from. (Prelim Tr., p.6, Ls.6-22; Defendant's Exhibit A, 0:50 - 3:15.) The 
trooper noticed that Sparling's hands were shaking, that he was "extremely 
anxious to separate himself from the vehicle," had "a lot of nervous energy," and 
wasn't able to stand still. (Prelim Tr., p.6, L.21 - p.7, L.6; Defendant's Exhibit A, 
1 :00 - 5:30.) 
Trooper Higley then returned to his patrol vehicle and requested the 
presence of certified canine officer Keith Whitworth, who was in the area. (Prelim 
Tr., p.8, Ls.2-4.) The trooper then returned to Sparling's vehicle, where Sparling 
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consented to a search of his person (Prelim Tr., p.8, Ls.5-6; Defendant's Exhibit 
4:30 - 5: 1 During that search, the trooper smelled the odor of marijuana 
coming from Sparling. (Prelim Tr., p.8, Ls.7-8.) The trooper asked Sparling 
when he had last used marijuana, and Sparling admitted that he had done so "a 
couple of days ago." (Prelim Tr., p.8, Ls.8-9; Defendant's Exhibit A, 5: 15 - 5:30.) 
Sparling also admitted that there were some marijuana "roaches" in the center 
console of his vehicle. (Prelim Tr., p.8, Ls.8-11; Defendant's Exhibit A, 5:25-
5:40.) 
While this conversation occurred, Officer Whitworth deployed his drug dog 
around Sparling's vehicle. (Prelim Tr., p.30, Ls.16-21; Defendant's Exhibit A, 
5:20 - 7:10.) The dog alerted on the vehicle. (Prelim Tr., p.30, Ls.21-23.) 
Trooper Higley and another officer then searched Sparling's vehicle and located 
a large bag of marijuana "roaches" and other drug paraphernalia in the center 
console, and two leather bags containing a total of 388 grams of marijuana in the 
trunk. (Prelim Tr., p.10, Ls.15-21; PSI, p.3.) Sparling told Trooper Higley that he 
had planned to give the marijuana to a friend in the Boise area. (Prelim Tr., p.11, 
Ls.18-22.) 
The state charged Sparling with possession of marijuana with intent to 
deliver, and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.9-11.) After 
a preliminary hearing, the case was bound over to the district court. (R., pp.20-
22; see generally Prelim. Tr.) 
Sparling filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his 
vehicle. (R., pp.33-35.) Specifically, Sparling argued that Trooper Hilgey's initial 
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traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion, and that even if was, the 
trooper duration and scope of the stop to conduct a 
investigation. (Id.) Spariing also argued that his admissions to the trooper were 
inadmissible pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966), (Id.) 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court admitted a DVD 
of the traffic stop into evidence, and took judicial notice of the preliminary hearing 
transcript. (See generally 1/25/13 Tr.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
district court denied Sparling's motion to suppress. (R., pp.70-72; 1/25/13 Tr., 
p.74, L.24-p.106, L.3.) 
Sparling entered an I.C.R. 11 conditional guilty plea to possession of 
marijuana with the intent to deliver, preserving his right to appeal the district 
court's denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.89-99; 7/12/13 Tr., p.4, L.19-
p.9, L.25.) Pursuant to the agreement, the state dismissed the misdemeanor 
drug paraphernalia charge. (R., pp.117-118; 7/12/13 Tr., p.1, Ls.17-23.) The 
district court entered a withheld judgment and placed Sparling on probation for 
two years. (R., pp.113-115; 10/25/13 Tr., p.11, L.5 - p.13, L.9.) Sparling timely 
appealed. (R., pp.126-128.) 
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ISSUE 
states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Sparling's motion 
to suppress after his initially lawful seizure was unreasonably 
extended? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Sparling failed to show the district court erred when it denied his 
motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
Sparling Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Denied His Motion 
To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Sparling contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress. (See generally Appellant's brief.) Specifically, Sparling contends that 
the district court erred in concluding that Trooper Higley did not unconstitutionally 
expand the scope and duration of the traffic stop. (Id.) However, a review of the 
record reveals that Trooper Higley did not significantly expand the scope and 
duration of the stop for the purpose of a drug investigation until he had 
reasonable suspicion to do so. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, 
the appellate court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Purdum, 147 
Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009) (citing State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 
232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005)). The appellate court will accept the trial court's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the trial 
court's application of constitutional principles and determinations of reasonable 
suspicion, in light of the facts found. Purdum, 147 Idaho at 207, 207 P.3d at 183 
(citing State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007)), State v. 
\, 
Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 127, 233 P.3d 52, 58 (2010). 
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Trooper Higley Did Not Unconstitutionally Extend The Scope Or Duration 
Of The Traffic Stop 
It is well-settled a police officer may, in compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an individual if that officer entertains 
a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is underway. State v. Gallegos, 120 
Idaho 894, 896, 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1991). Because a routine vehicle traffic stop 
is normally limited in scope and duration, it is analogous to an investigative 
detention and is analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1 (1968). Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 
980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). 
With regard to the permissible scope of a traffic stop, officers may conduct 
brief inquiries unrelated to the purpose of the stop, as long as the duration of the 
stop is not significantly extended. State v. Parkinson 135 Idaho 357, 362, 17 
P.3d 301, 306 (Ct. App. 2000). For example, an officer conducting a legal traffic 
stop may permissibly ask for consent to search the vehicle while the driver is still 
detained, when that request only momentarily extends the stop. State v. Silva, 
134 Idaho 848, 852-53, 11 P.3d 44, 48-49 (Ct. App. 2000). An officer may also 
ask the driver for his license and registration, request that the driver exit his 
vehicle, and ask the driver about his destination and purpose on the road. 
Parkinson 135 Idaho at 363, 17 P.3d at 307; State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 
496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008). 
With regard to duration, "[a]n investigative detention must be temporary 
and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." 
Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496, 198 P.3d at 134 (citations omitted). "There is no 
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rigid time limit for determining when a detention has lasted longer than 
necessary; rather, a court must consider the scope of the detention and the law 
enforcement purposes to be served, as well as the duration of the stop." A 
detention becomes unreasonable if an officer significantly extends the duration of 
the stop to investigate other criminal conduct. Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983-984, 
88 P.3d at 1223-1224. 
However, the purpose of a stop, and the length of the stop to effectuate its 
purpose, is not necessarily fixed at the time of initiation. See, ~, State v. 
Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Although the 
vehicular stop began as one to investigate the operation of an unregistered 
automobile, information quickly developed which justified expansion of the 
detention to investigate a possible drug offense."). Thus, a routine traffic stop 
may be lawfully extended to deploy a drug sniffing dog where, during the stop, 
the officer acquires reasonable suspicion that the driver of the vehicle possesses 
drugs. kl; Grantham, 146 Idaho at 497, 198 P.3d at 135. 
The "reasonable suspicion" standard requires an officer to articulate 
specific facts which, along with the reasonable inferences from those facts, justify 
the suspicion that the person is or has been involved in criminal activity. 
Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896-897, 821 P.2d at 951-952; State v. Martinez, 129 
Idaho 426, 430, 925 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Ct. App. 1996). Reasonable suspicion is 
a less demanding standard than probable cause. Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896, 
821 P.2d at 951. Whether the officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to 
detain a citizen is determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. 
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State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 2004). 
Although a series facts may appear innocent when viewed separateiy, they 
may warrant further investigation when viewed together. Brumfield, 136 Idaho at 
917, 42 P.3d at 710. The presence of reasonable suspicion is an objective test 
that does not depend on the individual officer's subjective thought processes. 
State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 489, 211 P.3d 91, 98 (2009) (citing Deen v. 
State, 131 Idaho 435, 436, 958 P.2d 592, 593 (1998)); see also Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-813 (1996). 
"The smell of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement 
for a warrantless search." State v. Gonzalez, 117 Idaho 518, 789 P.2d 206 (Ct. 
App. 1990) (quoting State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453, 641 P.2d 484,487 (N.M. 1982) 
(emphasis in original)). A suspect's excessive nervousness may contribute to a 
finding of reasonable suspicion. See State v. Johnson. 137 Idaho 656, 660, 51 
P .3d 1112, 1116 (Ct. App. 2002). 
In this case, Sparling does not challenge the legality of the initial traffic 
stop, the eventual finding of probable cause that justified the search of his 
vehicle, or any of the district court's factual determinations. (See generally 
Appellant's brief.) Instead, Sparling contends that Trooper Higley violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights by expanding the scope and duration of the traffic stop 
"beyond the time necessary to issue a citation" for the underlying traffic offense. 
(Id.) However, as the district court correctly concluded, there was no significant 
extension of the stop prior to the point at which Trooper Higley obtained probable 
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cause to search the vehicle, and even if there was, such an extension was 
justified by reasonable suspicion activity. 
The traffic stop was short in duration. Approximately four minutes elapsed 
between Trooper Higley's initial contact with Sparling outside of Sparling's 
vehicle, and the consensual pat-down search - the time at which Trooper Higley 
smelled the odor of marijuana coming from Sparling. (Defendant's Exhibit A, 
0:51 - 4:52.) On appeal, Sparling does not appear to contest that the officers 
had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop and to deploy the drug dog by 
this latter point, after Trooper Higley smelled the marijuana. Therefore, the 
relevant questions in this case are: (1) whether the officers significantly extended 
the duration and scope of the traffic stop beyond its original purpose in those four 
minutes; and (2) if so, whether any such brief extension was justified by 
reasonable suspicion. 
A review of the preliminary hearing transcript and video of the encounter 
reveals that most, if not all, of the relevant four-minute portion of the traffic stop 
consisted of routine questions regarding the failure to signal infraction, and 
permissible "brief inquiries unrelated to the purpose of the stop." After informing 
him of the reason for the stop, Trooper Higley asked Sparling for his license and 
registration, whether he was still living at the address depicted on the license, 
where he was coming from, what he did for a living, whether the contracting 
business was as slow in California as it was in Idaho, why he appeared to be so 
nervous, and whether he would consent to a search of his vehicle. (Defendant's 
Exhibit A, 0:51 - 3:12.) Then, after briefly returning to his patrol vehicle, Trooper 
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Higley informed Sparling that he intended to have another officer deploy a drug 
dog. (Defendant's Exhibit - 4:48.) Immediately after this, (and 
approximately 20 seconds after returning from his patrol vehicle to re-engage 
Sparling), Trooper Higley smelled marijuana during a consensual search of 
Sparling's person. (Defendant's Exhibit A, 4:52 - 5: 18.) Thus, there was no 
significant or unreasonable extension of the duration or scope of the stop until 
the drug dog was actually deployed - at which point Trooper Higley had already 
smelled marijuana and had obtained, at the very least, reasonable suspicion to 
extend the stop. 
On appeal, Sparling questions the Idaho Court of Appeals' holding in 
Parkinson, in which the Court noted that "brief inquiries not otherwise related to 
the initial purpose of the stop do not necessarily violate a detainee's Fourth 
Amendment rights." (Appellant's brief, pp.10-11 (noting that the Idaho Supreme 
Court "is not bound" to follow Parkinson).) In Parkinson, the Court of Appeals 
recognized a federal circuit split on the issue of whether, and to what extent, an 
officer's questioning unrelated to the purposes of a traffic stop is itself a Fourth 
Amendment violation. Parkinson 135 Idaho at 362, 17 P .3d at 306. The Court 
ultimately sided with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which rejected that notion. 
kt (citing United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir.1993)). More 
recently, the United States Supreme Court held that "[a]n officer's inquiries into 
matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the 
encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries 
10 
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extend the duration of the stop." Arizona v. Johnson, 
(citation omitted). 
While the above-cited portion of Parkinson dealt with brief expansions of 
the scope of detentions, the Idaho appellate courts and the United States 
Supreme Court have also declined to take a bright-line approach with respect to 
brief expansions of the duration of traffic stops. Rather than hold that any brief 
extension of a traffic stop for reasons unrelated to the purpose of the stop 
violates the Fourth Amendment, these courts have described an unconstitutional 
delay as one that is "significant" or "measurable" or as one that occurs after the 
original purpose of the stop has been fulfilled. See Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 984, 
88 P.3d at 1224; Johnson 555 U.S. at 333-334; State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 
8, 217 P.3d 1, 8 (Ct. App. 2009); see also United States v. Olivera-Mendez, 484 
F.3d 505, 510 (8th Cir. 2007) ("[A]n officer does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment by asking a few questions about matters unrelated to the traffic 
violation, even if this conversation briefly extends the length of the detention") 
(citing United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Burton, 334 F.3d 514, 518-519 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 951-954 (7th Cir. 2002)). In this case, as discussed 
above, even if any such delay occurred, it was very short, and not intrusive. 
Such a delay cannot be considered "significant," "measurable," or "unreasonable" 
in the context of this stop. 
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In the alternative, even if some portion of the relevant four-minute period 
constituted a significant or measurable extension of the duration and scope of the 
stop, Trooper Higley had reasonable suspicion to justify such an extension. First, 
Sparling's unusual behavior indicated a desire to "separate himself from the 
vehicle" and from the contents therein. (Prelim Tr. p.6, L.21 - p.7, L.23.) After 
Trooper Higley pulled in behind Sparling, rather than wait in his car for the 
trooper to approach, Sparling immediately left his vehicle and walked towards the 
patrol car. (Defendant's Exhibit A, 0:35 - 0:50.) During the initial questioning, 
Sparling also twice left his vehicle without being asked to do so. (Defendant's 
Exhibit A, 1 :25 - 1 :42; 2:25 - 2:55.) Second, Sparling exhibited extreme 
nervousness. Trooper Higley observed that Sparling's hands were shaking, that 
he had nervous energy, and that he couldn't stand still. (Defendant's Exhibit A, 
1 :00 - 5:30; Prelim Tr., p.6, L.21 - p.7, L.6.) Sparling's unusual behavior, efforts 
to separate himself from his vehicle, and extreme nervousness constituted 
reasonable suspicion for Trooper Higley to briefly extend the traffic stop. 
Sparling has failed to show that the district court erred in concluding that 
Trooper Higley did not unconstitutionally extend either the scope or the duration 
of the traffic stop. This Court should therefore affirm the district court's denial of 
Sparling's motion to suppress. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state affirm district court's 
denial of Sparling's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 11th day of August 2014 
MARK W. OLSON ' 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11th day of August 2014, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
JASON C. PINTLER 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
~LS~~" 
Deputy Attorney General 
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